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Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?

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  • Ioannidou, Vasso P.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

Volume (Year): 14 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 58-85

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:14:y:2005:i:1:p:58-85

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

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References

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  1. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.
  2. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph M. Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trips It's Been," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(2), pages 55-218.
  3. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," NBER Working Papers 5146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 625-38, August.
  5. Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1995. "Measuring monetary policy," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 95-09, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  6. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Is There a `Credit Channel' for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 4977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  8. Anil K Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein & David W. Wilcox, 1992. "Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence From the Composition of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 4015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Is there a "credit channel" for monetary policy?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 63-77.
  10. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653, May.
  11. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
  12. Hancock, Diana & Laing, Andrew J. & Wilcox, James A., 1995. "Bank capital shocks: Dynamic effects on securities, loans, and capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 661-677, June.
  13. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1996. "Combining bank supervision and monetary policy," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Nov.
  14. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  15. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Is there a "credit channel" for monetary policy?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 63-77.
  16. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1994. "Do Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank Credit and Cause a "Credit Crunch"' in the United States?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 585-628, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Agur, I. & Demertzis, M., 2010. "Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking," Discussion Paper 2010-30S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September.
  3. Franck, Raphaƫl & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.
  4. Xavier Freixas, 2009. "Monetary policy in a systemic crisis," Economics Working Papers 1200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  5. Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2013. "Financial supervision regimes and bank efficiency: International evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5463-5475.
  6. Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2010. "Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy," Economics Working Papers 1202, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  7. Reinhart, Carmen & Felton, Andrew, 2008. "The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century," MPRA Paper 11862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Agur, Itai & Demertzis, Maria, 2012. "Excessive bank risk taking and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 1457, European Central Bank.
  9. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  10. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
  11. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2008. "Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2286, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Ryan Stever & James A Wilcox, 2007. "Regulatory discretion and banks' pursuit of "safety in similarity"," BIS Working Papers 235, Bank for International Settlements.

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