Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJD-4D3B17V-1/2/d83b588fd30cf165313679bece3f50d2
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

Volume (Year): 14 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 58-85

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:14:y:2005:i:1:p:58-85

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
• E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
• G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
• G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.
   
   • Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1993. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Working Papers 93-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
2. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is bank supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
   
   • Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653, May.
3. Anil K Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein & David W. Wilcox, 1992. "Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence From the Composition of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 4015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Kashyap, Anil K & Stein, Jeremy C & Wilcox, David W, 1993. "Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence from the Composition of External Finance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 78-98, March.
   • Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein & David W. Wilcox, 1991. "Monetary policy and credit conditions: evidence from the composition of external finance," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 154, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
4. Hancock, Diana & Laing, Andrew J. & Wilcox, James A., 1995. "Bank capital shocks: Dynamic effects on securities, loans, and capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 661-677, June.
5. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
6. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Is there a "credit channel" for monetary policy?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 63-77.
7. Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1998. "Measuring Monetary Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 869-902, August.
   
   • Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1995. "Measuring monetary policy," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 95-09, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
   • Bernanke, Ben S. & Mihov, Ilian, 1995. "Measuring Monetary Policy," Economics Series 10, Institute for Advanced Studies.
   • Tom Doan, . "RATS programs to replicate Bernanke and Mihov QJE 1998," Statistical Software Components RTZ00013, Boston College Department of Economics.
   • Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1995. "Measuring Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 5145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
8. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1991. "The capital crunch: neither a borrower nor a lender be," Working Papers 91-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
   
   • Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 625-38, August.
   • Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1993. "The Capital Crunch: Neither A Borrower Nor A Lender Be," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 243, Boston College Department of Economics.
9. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Working Papers 95-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
   
   • Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
   • Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," NBER Working Papers 5146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
10. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
11. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Is There a `Credit Channel' for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 4977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
12. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    
    • Di Noia, Carmine & Di Giorgio, Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-78, November.
    • Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
13. repec:fip:fedlpr:y:1995:i:may:p:63-77 is not listed on IDEAS
14. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1994. "Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit and cause a "credit crunch" in the United States?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 585-633.
    
    • Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1994. "Do Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank Credit and Cause a "Credit Crunch"' in the United States?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 585-628, August.
15. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph M. Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trips It's Been," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(2), pages 55-218.
    
    • Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
16. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1996. "Combining bank supervision and monetary policy," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Nov.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:

1. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
   
   • Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September.
2. Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2010. "Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets and Monetary Policy," Working Papers 429, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
   
   • Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2011. "Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(8), pages 2656-2692.
   • Freixas, X. & Martin, A. & Skeie, D., 2010. "Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy," Discussion Paper 2010-35S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2009. "Bank liquidity, interbank markets, and monetary policy," Staff Reports 371, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
   • Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2010. "Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy," Economics Working Papers 1202, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
3. Xavier Freixas, 2009. "Monetary policy in a systemic crisis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 630-653, Winter.
   
   • Xavier Freixas, 2009. "Monetary policy in a systemic crisis," Economics Working Papers 1200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
4. Itai Agur & Maria Demertzis, 2012. "Excessive bank risk taking and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 1457, European Central Bank.
5. Ryan Stever & James A Wilcox, 2007. "Regulatory discretion and banks' pursuit of "safety in similarity"," BIS Working Papers 235, Bank for International Settlements.
6. Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.
7. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2008. "Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2286, CESifo Group Munich.
8. Reinhart, Carmen & Felton, Andrew, 2008. "The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century," MPRA Paper 11862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
9. Itai Agur & Maria Demertzis, 2010. "Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking," DNB Working Papers 271, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
   
   • Agur, I. & Demertzis, M., 2010. "Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking," Discussion Paper 2010-30S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:14:y:2005:i:1:p:58-85

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal