Combining bank supervision and monetary policy
AbstractIn the United States, the Federal Reserve has responsibility for both monetary policy and bank supervision. Other countries separate these functions to varying degrees. What lies behind this global diversity? Should a central bank be charged with conducting monetary policy and regulating banks, or does it make more sense — both economic and political — to keep these activities separate? The answer is not a simple yes or no. Rather, it appears that the right choice depends on a country’s prevailing conditions, including its financial system, its political environment, and the preferences of the public.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its journal Economic Commentary.
Volume (Year): (1996)
Issue (Month): Nov ()
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