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Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision

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  • Charles M. Kahn
  • João A.C. Santos

Abstract

Bank regulation in most countries encompasses a lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision. These functions are interrelated and therefore require coordination among the authorities responsible for them. These authorities, however, are often established with different mandates, some of which are likely to be in conflict. We consider these issues by studying the optimal institutional allocation of such functions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Proceedings with number 717.

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Length: 648-666
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2001 : 37th) ; The financial net: costs, benefits, and implications for regulation
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:717

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Keywords: Lenders of last resort ; Deposit insurance ; Bank supervision ; Bank liquidity;

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References

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  1. Preventing bank runs – a primer
    by ? in Bruegel blog on 2013-04-02 10:58:20
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