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Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?

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Viral V. Acharya (London Business School)

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Abstract

The merit of international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of different central banks is examined. The lack of a complementary variation between minimum bank capital requirements and regulatory forbearance leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies. Linking the central bank's forbearance to its alignment with domestic bank owners, it is shown that in equilibrium, a regression toward the worst closure policy may result: The central banks of initially less forbearing economies also adopt greater forbearance. Copyright 2003 by the American Finance Association.

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Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 58 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 2745-2782
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:6:p:2745-2782

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  2. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  4. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2005. "Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, 2004. "Financial Liberalisation and Capital Regulation in Open Economies," OFRC Working Papers Series 2004fe10, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Calzolari, Giacomo & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2004. "Regulation of Multinational banks: A Theoretical Inquiry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4232, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Gyongyi Loranth & Alan Morrison, 2003. "Multinational Bank Capital Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe11, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "Bank Size and Risk-Taking under Basel II," Discussion Papers 88, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2004. "Cooperation in international banking supervision," Working Paper Series 316, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  11. Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes -- Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-53, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Hege, Ulrich & Feess, Eberhard, 2007. "Basel II and the Value of Bank Differentiation," Les Cahiers de Recherche 879, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
  15. Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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