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Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?

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  • Viral V. Acharya

    (London Business School)

Abstract

The merit of international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of different central banks is examined. The lack of a complementary variation between minimum bank capital requirements and regulatory forbearance leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies. Linking the central bank's forbearance to its alignment with domestic bank owners, it is shown that in equilibrium, a regression toward the worst closure policy may result: The central banks of initially less forbearing economies also adopt greater forbearance. Copyright 2003 by the American Finance Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 58 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 2745-2782

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:6:p:2745-2782

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