Ralf Bebenroth (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University) Diemo Dietrich (Halle Institute for Economic Research) Uwe Vollmer (University of Leipzig)
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This paper describes and compares the regulation and supervision of banks in Japan and Germany. We have chosen these countries because they have both bank-dominated financial systems and belong to the same law tradition, yet, bank stability differs significantly. We ask to what extent these countries follow best practice regulations in banking and whether differences in banking stability and efficiency can be explained by regulatory and supervisory differences. We argue that bank regulation and supervision are less efficient in Japan than in Germany and show why Japan and Germany have made different regulatory and supervisory choices.
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Paper provided by Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
211.