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Deposit Insurance and Lender-of-Last-Resort Functions

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Author Info
Sleet, Christopher
Smith, Bruce D

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Abstract

We consider issues concerning the design of a banking system "safety net" when both a deposit insurer and a lender of last resort are present. In our model both entities have a role to play. Moreover, issues related to deposit insurance pricing are relatively unimportant in this context, whereas issues related to discount window access and pricing are not. We discuss when and why (or why not) a lender of last resort should lend liberally but charge high rates of interest. And, we raise the possibility that discount window policy may enhance or reduce the scope for multiplicity of equilibria.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 32 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 518-75
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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:32:y:2000:i:3:p:518-75

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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  1. Antoine Martin, 2001. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance : preventing bank panics without moral hazard?," Research Working Paper RWP 01-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Antoine Martin, 2008. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to September 11," Staff Reports 217, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  3. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Ralf Bebenroth & Diemo Dietrich & Uwe Vollmer, 2009. "Bank regulation and supervision in bank-dominated financial systems: a comparison between Japan and Germany," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 177-209, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gianni De Nicolo, 2001. "Size, charter value, and risk in banking: an international perspective," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 197-215.
  6. Narayana R Kocherlakota & Ilhyock Shim, 2005. "Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000512, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  8. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Klüh, Ulrich, 2005. "Safety Net Design and Systemic Risk: New Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers in Economics 662, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Antoine Martin, 2002. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to Sept. 11," Research Working Paper RWP 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
  11. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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