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Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision

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Author Info
Charles M. Kahn (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance)
João A. C. Santos (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

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Abstract

Bank regulation in most countries encompasses a lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision. These functions are interrelated and therefore require coordination among the authorities responsible for them. These authorities, however, are often established with different mandates, some of which are likely to be in conflict. We consider these issues by studying the optimal institutional allocation of such functions.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank for International Settlements in its series BIS Working Papers with number 102.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2001
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Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:102

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  1. Beck, Thorsten, 2008. "Bank competition and financial stability : friends or foes ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4656, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. David G. Mayes & María J. Nieto & Larry Wall, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Banco de España Working Papers 0819, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Klüh, Ulrich, 2005. "Safety Net Design and Systemic Risk: New Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers in Economics 662, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Xavier Freixas & Bruno M. Parigi & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2003. "The Lender of Last Resort: A 21st Century Approach," Economics Working Papers 708, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Martin Čihák & Richard Podpiera, 2006. "Is One Watchdog Better than Three? International Experience with Integrated Financial-Sector Supervision (in English)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 56(3-4), pages 102-126, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  7. Greg Caldwell, 2005. "An Analysis of Closure Policy under Alternative Regulatory Structures," Working Papers 05-11, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), September. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Donato Masciandaro & María J. Nieto & Henriëtte Prast, 2007. "Financial governance of banking supervision," Banco de España Working Papers 0725, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
  10. Totzek, Alexander, 2008. "The Bank, the Bank-Run, and the Central Bank: The Impact of Early Deposit Withdrawals in a New Keynesian Framework," Economics Working Papers 2008,20, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Rafael Repullo, 2004. "Policies For Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework," Working Papers wp2004_0418, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Panagiotis Staikouras & Christos Staikouras & Maria-Eleni Agoraki, 2007. "The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ioan Talpos & Bogdan Dima & Mihai Mutascu & Cosmin Enache, 2005. "A New Approach Of The Budget Deficit: An Empirical Analysis," Public Economics 0510023, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Mayes, David G & Nieto, Maria J & Wall , Larry, 2007. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: is Prompt Corrective Action a partial solution?," Research Discussion Papers 7/2007, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  16. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics," Department of Economics University of Siena 447, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Itai Agur, 2009. "What Institutional Structure for the Lender of Last Resort?," DNB Working Papers 200, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  18. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
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