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An incentive based theory of bank regulation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Tim S. Campbell
Yuk-Shee Chan
Anthony M. Marino
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Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its journal Proceedings .
Volume (Year): (1990)
Issue (Month): Nov ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpr:y:1990:i:nov:x:3Contact details of provider: Postal: P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA 94120-7702 Phone: (415) 974-2000 Fax: (415) 974-3333 Email: Web page: http://www.frbsf.org/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Bank supervision ; Banks and banking ; Other versions of this item:
Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997.
"Deposit insurance, bank incentives, and the design of regulatory policy ,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
1998-10, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
[Downloadable!]
Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, .
"Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk ,"
Bank of England working papers
69, Bank of England.
[Downloadable!]
Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998.
"Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation ,"
Economic Policy Review ,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 137-143.
[Downloadable!]
Xavier Freixas & Emmanuelle Gabillon, 1996.
"Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System ,"
Economics Working Papers
175, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Loriana Pelizzon & Stephen Schaefer, 2005.
"Pillar 1 vs. Pillar 2 Under Risk Management ,"
NBER Working Papers
11666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schüler, Martin, 2003.
"Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision : The European Case ,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002.
"State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved action and unobserved characteristics ,"
Working Paper Series
WP-02-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004.
"State-Contingent Bank Regulation With Unobserved Actionas And Unobserved Characteristics ,"
Working Papers
wp2004_0407, CEMFI.
[Downloadable!] Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004.
"State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics ,"
Working Paper
04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
[Downloadable!] Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006.
"State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics ,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control ,
Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997.
"The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements ,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
[Downloadable!]
Anjan V. Thakor, 2004.
"Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank ,"
Finance
0411027, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000.
"Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties ,"
Working Paper Series
WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Ben Craig, 1996.
"Competing currencies: back to the future? ,"
Economic Commentary ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Oct 15.
[Downloadable!]
João Cabral dos Santos, 1995.
"Bank capital and equity investment regulations ,"
Working Paper
9515, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.
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