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An incentive-based theory of bank regulation

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Author Info
Campbell, Tim S.
Chan, Yuk-Shee
Marino, Anthony M.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJD-4CYH5RJ-2/2/cf9495cbdbfcbb877e88950b4a0959b3
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

Volume (Year): 2 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 255-276
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:2:y:1992:i:3:p:255-276

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

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  1. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 137-143. [Downloadable!]
  2. Xavier Freixas & Emmanuelle Gabillon, 1996. "Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System," Economics Working Papers 175, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  3. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  5. João Cabral dos Santos, 1995. "Bank capital and equity investment regulations," Working Paper 9515, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Loriana Pelizzon & Stephen Schaefer, 2005. "Pillar 1 vs. Pillar 2 Under Risk Management," NBER Working Papers 11666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank," Finance 0411027, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "Deposit insurance, bank incentives, and the design of regulatory policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-10, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  10. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, . "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  11. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision : The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ben Craig, 1996. "Competing currencies: back to the future?," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Oct 15. [Downloadable!]
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