This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sophie Claeys,
Gleb Lanine
Koen Schoors ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp778.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp778.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: pages
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-778

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 724 E. University Ave. Wyly Hall, Floor 1, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1234
Phone: 734 615 4566
Fax: (734) 763-5850
Email:
Web page: http://www.wdi.umich.edu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Patricia Loh).

Related research
Keywords: Bank supervision; bank crisis; Russia.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Povel, Paul, 1999. "Optimal "Soft" or "Tough" Bankruptcy Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 659-84, October.
  2. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 51-, March.
  3. Pyle, William, 2002. "Overbanked and Credit-Starved: A Paradox of the Transition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 25-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wall, Larry D. & Peterson, David R., 1990. "The effect of Continental Illinois' failure on the financial performance of other banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 77-99, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kane, Edward J, 2000. "Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 671-701, August.
  6. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996. "The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems," International Finance Discussion Papers 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Haizhou Huang & C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 99/39, International Monetary Fund.
    Other versions:
  9. Heckman, James & Singer, Burton, 1984. "A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 271-320, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Koen Schoors, 2001. "The credit squeeze during Russia's early transition: A bank-based view," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 9(1), pages 205-228, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is bank supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Claudia M. Buch & Ralph P. Heinrich, 1999. "Handling Banking Crises — The Case of Russia," Kiel Working Papers 920, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  14. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2000. "Causes of U.S. Bank Distress During the Depression," NBER Working Papers 7919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. V.V. Chari, 1989. "Banking without deposit insurance or bank panics: lessons from a model of the U.S. national banking system," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-19. [Downloadable!]
  19. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
    Other versions:
  20. Mailath George J. & Mester Loretta J., 1994. "A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 272-299, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Alonso, Irasema, 1996. "On avoiding bank runs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 73-87, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. X. Freixas & B. Parigi & J-C. Rochet, 2000. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by theCentral Bank," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 47, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  24. William Tompson, 2004. "Banking Reform in Russia: Problems and Prospects," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 410, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  25. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  26. Acharya, Sankarshan, 1996. "Charter value, minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 351-375, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Sophie Brana & Mathilde Maurel & Jerome Sgard, 1999. "Enterprise Adjustment and the Role of Bank Credit in Russia: Evidence from a 420 Firm's Qualitative Survey," Working Papers 1999-06, CEPII research center. [Downloadable!]
  28. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-127, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  29. Laeven, Luc, 2001. "Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 207-229, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Perotti, Enrico, 2002. "Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft Legal Constraints," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(3), pages 359-99, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  31. Rafael Repullo, 2000. "Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
    Other versions:
  32. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler, 2004. "A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-130, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  33. Neil Wallace, 1990. "A banking model in which partial suspension is best," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 11-23. [Downloadable!]
  34. Edward J. Kane, 2000. "Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulators infer from event-study evidence?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 671-705.
  35. Christopher Sleet & Bruce D. Smith, 2000. "Deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort functions," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 518-579.
    Other versions:
  36. Dr. Peter Kenning & Hilke Plassmann, 2004. "NeuroEconomics," Experimental 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.