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Did U.S. bank supervisors get tougher during the credit crunch? Did they get easier during the banking boom? Did it matter to bank lending?

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  • Allen N. Berger
  • Margaret K. Kyle
  • Joseph M. Scalise

Abstract

We test three hypotheses regarding changes in supervisory "toughness" and their effects on bank lending. The data provide modest support for all three hypotheses that there was an increase in toughness during the credit crunch period (1989-1992), that there was a decline in toughness during the boom period (1993-1998), and that changes in toughness, if they occurred, affected bank lending. However, all of the measured effects are small, with 1% or less of loans receiving harsher or easier classification, about 3% of banks receiving better or worse CAMEL ratings, and bank lending being changed by 1% or less of assets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 2000-39.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2000-39

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Keywords: Bank supervision ; Credit ; Bank loans;

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References

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  2. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1994. "Do Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank Credit and Cause a "Credit Crunch"' in the United States?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 585-628, August.
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  6. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph M. Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trips It's Been," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(2), pages 55-218.
  7. Holthausen, Robert W. & Leftwich, Richard W., 1986. "The effect of bond rating changes on common stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 57-89, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Allen N. Berger & Leora F. Klapper & Gegory F. Udell, 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Proceedings 709, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  2. Gabriella Chiesa, . "Incentive-based Lending Capacity, Competition and Regulation in Banking," Working Papers 92, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  3. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2003. "The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-02, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  4. Radu Muntean, 2009. "Early Warning Models for Banking Supervision in Romania," Advances in Economic and Financial Research - DOFIN Working Paper Series 39, Bucharest University of Economics, Center for Advanced Research in Finance and Banking - CARFIB.
  5. Athanasoglou, Panayiotis P. & Daniilidis, Ioannis & Delis, Manthos D., 2014. "Bank procyclicality and output: Issues and policies," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 58-83.
  6. John R. Hall & Thomas B. King & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2002. "Do jumbo-CD holders care about anything?," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2002-05, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  7. Bruggeman, Annick & Donnay, Marie, 2003. "A monthly monetary model with banking intermediation for the euro area," Working Paper Series 0264, European Central Bank.
  8. Kanas, Angelos, 2013. "Bank dividends, risk, and regulatory regimes," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-10.
  9. Curry, Timothy J. & Fissel, Gary S. & Hanweck, Gerald A., 2008. "Is there cyclical bias in bank holding company risk ratings?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1297-1309, July.
  10. Krainer, Robert, 2009. "Portfolio and financing adjustments for U.S. banks: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, January.

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