Bank Real Estate And The New England Capital Crunch
AbstractThe stock of real estate loans held by New England Banks has declined dramatically. Given the limited potential for real estate investments, weak demand for real estate loans is to be expected. However supply as well as demand for real estate factors may account for some of the decline in bank real estate loan. This paper documents that the bank lending only for real estate may have been constrained by a capital crunch, whereby poorly capitalized banks shrank their asset, including real estate loans, to satisfy capital requirements. Because the loss of bank capital is so widespread in New England, bank dependent borrowers may have difficulty obtaining real estate financing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 246.
Date of creation: Dec 1993
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