Do capital markets predict problems in large commercial banks?
AbstractIn the present climate of intense debate over deposit insurance reform, the nature and limits of market discipline become especially important. The widely accepted argument for greater reliance on market discipline is that it will restrain managerial risk-taking and reduce potential losses to the deposit insurance fund. Opponents of this view favor the traditional reliance on supervision by the bank regulatory agencies as the primary method to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system and the integrity of the deposit insurance fund. ; This article attempts to shed some empirical light on the issue by studying the effectiveness of market discipline as it is exercised by bank stockholders. Residual analysis is used to test whether the market anticipates the bank’s downgrade to a problem bank status. The results show that shareholder returns fail to anticipate bank downgrades by examiners. These results cast serious doubt on the supposed advantages investors, and particularly uninsured depositors, would have over bank regulators in restraining risk-taking by banks and in monitoring their management.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its journal New England Economic Review.
Volume (Year): (1991)
Issue (Month): May ()
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pettway, Richard H., 1980. "Potential Insolvency, Market Efficiency, and Bank Regulation of Large Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(01), pages 219-236, March.
- Pettway, Richard H & Sinkey, Joseph F, Jr, 1980. " Establishing On-Site Bank Examination Priorities: An Early-Warning System Using Accounting and Market Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(1), pages 137-50, March.
- Fama, Eugene F, et al, 1969. "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2000.
"Did U.S. bank supervisors get tougher during the credit crunch? Did they get easier during the banking boom? Did it matter to bank lending?,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2000-39, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2001. "Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 301-356 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2000. "Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get Tougher During the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier During the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Working Papers 7689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark Flannery, 2001. "The Faces of “Market Discipline”," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 107-119, October.
- Berger, Allen N & Davies, Sally M & Flannery, Mark J, 2000.
"Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 641-67, August.
- Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 641-670.
- Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 1998. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-32, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- DeYoung, Robert E. & Hughes, Joseph P. & Moon, Choon-Geol, 2001.
"Efficient risk-taking and regulatory covenant enforcement in a deregulated banking industry,"
Journal of Economics and Business,
Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 255-282.
- Joseph P. Hughes & Choon-Geol Moon & Robert DeYoung, 2000. "Efficient Risk-Taking and Regulatory Covenant Enforcement in a Deregulated Banking Industry," Departmental Working Papers 200007, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K, 1998.
"Staying Afloat When the Wind Shifts: External Factors and Emerging-Market Banking Crises,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1828, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barry Eichengreen & Andrew K. Rose, 1998. "Staying Afloat When the Wind Shifts: External Factors and Emerging-Market Banking Crises," NBER Working Papers 6370, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies, 1994.
"The information content of bank examinations,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
94-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Caprio, Gerard Jr., 1996. "Bank regulation : the case of the missing model," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1574, The World Bank.
- Kaen, Fred R. & Michalsen, Dag, 1997. "The effects of the Norwegian banking crisis on Norwegian equities," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 83-111, June.
- D.T. Llewellyn, 2000. "Some Lessons for Bank Regulation from Recent Crises," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 51, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Summers, Lawrence H., 1993. "Finance and its reform : beyond laissez-faire," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1171, The World Bank.
- repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:48:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gropp, Reint & Richards, Anthony J., 2001. "Rating agency actions and the pricing of debt and equity of European banks: What can we infer about private sector monitoring of bank soundness?," Working Paper Series 0076, European Central Bank.
- Alicia García Herrero, 2005. "Determinants of the Venezuelan Banking Crisis of the Mid-1990s: An Event History Analysis," Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA, , vol. 0(1), pages 71-115, January-J.
- Linda Allen & Julapa Jagtiani & James Moser, 2001. "Further Evidence on the Information Content of Bank Examination Ratings: A Study of BHC-to-FHC Conversion Applications," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 213-232, October.
- John S. Jordan, 1999. "Pricing bank stocks: the contribution of bank examinations," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 39-53.
- Curry, Timothy J. & Elmer, Peter J. & Fissel, Gary S., 2007. "Equity market data, bank failures and market efficiency," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(6), pages 536-559.
- Lee, Wai Sing & Kwok, Chuck C. Y., 2000. "Domestic and international practice of deposit insurance: a survey," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 29-62, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Catherine Spozio).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.