Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Finance and its reform : beyond laissez-faire

Contents:

Author Info

  • Caprio, Gerard Jr.
  • Summers, Lawrence H.

Abstract

That the financial sector should be liberalized was the orthodox view in the mid-1970s, during a pendulum swing toward reliance on the free market. In the early 1980s, the pendulum swung back to the left, based partly on evidence - especially from Latin America - that overly rapid reform had real costs, and partly on an increased appreciation of financial market failure. Blind adherence to free market principles was no longer appropriate. Now a counter-counterrevolution is in sight, with some swing back toward the view that the market makes a mess of it, but the government makes it even worse. The authors agree that market-oriented financial systems appear to do a better job than systems with extensive government involvement, but contend that the assumption that perfect competition will solve all problems in finance - especially in banking - can be dangerous. Information problems, implicit or explicit government guarantees associated with the payments system make banks unique. Governments implicitly recognize banking's uniqueness - few allow just anyone to enter banking - but public pronouncements and observers'recommendations often favor a move to more competition. Perfect competition, however, is optimal under the assumption, among others, of no government guarantee. In fact, most governments differ only in how explicit they are about their deposit insurance schemes. The financial reforms most likely to succeed are those that give banks an incentive to engage in safe and sound banking. When excessive competition is allowed, the charter value of banking diminishes to the point that it is no longer profitable for bankers to behave prudently. A consideration of finance's role, and a look at how reforming economies have fared, suggest also that gradual reform is often to be preferred in this domain. Deregulation of credit markets and interest rates can be counterproductive in unstable macroeconomic conditions and when banks are unsophisticated or have weak balance sheets. And changes in the charter value may evolve only slowly after reform. Faster progress and greater efforts should be made, however, in bank supervision and regulation and in institutional development, including accounting, auditing, legal and judicial reform, and training (of bankers and other finance professionals). In sum, many economies would benefit from less government intervention in financial markets, but the prescription should not be abrupt or total government withdrawal from the financial sector. Rather than intervening heavily in credit allocation decisions, governments should focus on doing what only they can do: providing an enabling environment for the private financial and nonfinancial sectors, and ensuring that financial operations are safe and sound.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1993/08/01/000009265_3961005052157/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1171.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 31 Aug 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1171

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Banks&Banking Reform; Financial Intermediation; Economic Theory&Research; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Katerina Simons & Stephen Cross, 1991. "Do capital markets predict problems in large commercial banks?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 51-56.
  2. Aleem, Irfan, 1990. "Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 4(3), pages 329-49, September.
  3. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  4. Besley, T., 1992. "How Do Market Failures Justify Interventions in Rural Credit Markets?," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
  5. Caprio, Gerard, Jr & Levine, Ross, 1994. "Reforming Finance in Transitional Socialist Economies," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 9(1), pages 1-24, January.
  6. Jung, Woo S, 1986. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: International Evidence," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 333-46, January.
  7. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  8. Howard Lee & Liliana Rojas-Suárez & Steven Riess Weisbrod, 1992. "Bank Risk and the Declining Franchise Value of the Banking Systems in the United States and Japan," IMF Working Papers 92/45, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Enrica Detragiache & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 1998. "Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility," IMF Working Papers 98/83, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Yotopoulos, Pan A., 1997. "Financial Crises and the Benefits of Mildly Repressed Exchange Rates," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 202, Stockholm School of Economics.
  3. Impavido, Gregorio & Musalem, Alberto R. & Tressel, Thierry, 2001. "Contractual savings institutions and banks'stability and efficiency," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2751, The World Bank.
  4. Wyplosz, Charles, 1999. "Financial Restraints and Liberalization in Postwar Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Vittorio Corbo, 1997. "Financial Integration in Latin America," Research Department Publications, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department 4096, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  6. Stijn Claessens, 1998. "Banking reform in transition countries," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(2), pages 115-133.
  7. Aka, Brou E., 2006. "On the duration of the financial system stability under liberalization," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 147-161, June.
  8. Vittorio Corbo, 1997. "Integración financiera en América Latina," Research Department Publications, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department 4097, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  9. Alba, Pedro & Hernandez, Leonardo & Klingebiel, Daniela, 1999. "Financial liberalization and the capital account : Thailand, 1988-97," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2188, The World Bank.
  10. Chebbi, Mohamed Jaber, 2005. "Existe-t-il un lien entre la libéralisation financière et les crises bancaires dans les pays émergents ?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5962, Paris Dauphine University.
  11. Clarke, George R. G. & Cull, Robert & D'Amato, Laura & Molinari, Andrea, 1999. "The effect of foreign entry on Argentina's domestic banking sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2158, The World Bank.
  12. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
  13. Ghosh, Saibal & Saggar, Mridul, 1998. "Narrow Banking: Theory, evidence and prospects in India," MPRA Paper 17352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Pleskovic, Boris, 1994. "Financial policies in socialist countries in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1242, The World Bank.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1171. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.