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Finance and its reform : beyond laissez-faire

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Author Info
Caprio, Gerard Jr.
Summers, Lawrence H.

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Abstract

That the financial sector should be liberalized was the orthodox view in the mid-1970s, during a pendulum swing toward reliance on the free market. In the early 1980s, the pendulum swung back to the left, based partly on evidence - especially from Latin America - that overly rapid reform had real costs, and partly on an increased appreciation of financial market failure. Blind adherence to free market principles was no longer appropriate. Now a counter-counterrevolution is in sight, with some swing back toward the view that the market makes a mess of it, but the government makes it even worse. The authors agree that market-oriented financial systems appear to do a better job than systems with extensive government involvement, but contend that the assumption that perfect competition will solve all problems in finance - especially in banking - can be dangerous. Information problems, implicit or explicit government guarantees associated with the payments system make banks unique. Governments implicitly recognize banking's uniqueness - few allow just anyone to enter banking - but public pronouncements and observers'recommendations often favor a move to more competition. Perfect competition, however, is optimal under the assumption, among others, of no government guarantee. In fact, most governments differ only in how explicit they are about their deposit insurance schemes. The financial reforms most likely to succeed are those that give banks an incentive to engage in safe and sound banking. When excessive competition is allowed, the charter value of banking diminishes to the point that it is no longer profitable for bankers to behave prudently. A consideration of finance's role, and a look at how reforming economies have fared, suggest also that gradual reform is often to be preferred in this domain. Deregulation of credit markets and interest rates can be counterproductive in unstable macroeconomic conditions and when banks are unsophisticated or have weak balance sheets. And changes in the charter value may evolve only slowly after reform. Faster progress and greater efforts should be made, however, in bank supervision and regulation and in institutional development, including accounting, auditing, legal and judicial reform, and training (of bankers and other finance professionals). In sum, many economies would benefit from less government intervention in financial markets, but the prescription should not be abrupt or total government withdrawal from the financial sector. Rather than intervening heavily in credit allocation decisions, governments should focus on doing what only they can do: providing an enabling environment for the private financial and nonfinancial sectors, and ensuring that financial operations are safe and sound.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1171.

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Date of creation: 31 Aug 1993
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1171

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Related research
Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Banks&Banking Reform; Financial Intermediation; Economic Theory&Research; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Besley, T., 1992. "How Do Market Failures Justify Interventions in Rural Credit Markets?," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
    Other versions:
  2. Jung, Woo S, 1986. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: International Evidence," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 333-46, January.
  3. Caprio, Gerard, Jr & Levine, Ross, 1994. "Reforming Finance in Transitional Socialist Economies," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-24, January.
  4. Katerina Simons & Stephen Cross, 1991. "Do capital markets predict problems in large commercial banks?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 51-56.
  5. Aleem, Irfan, 1990. "Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 329-49, September.
  6. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Liliana Rojas-Suárez & Steven Riess Weisbrod & Howard Lee, 1992. "Bank Risk and the Declining Franchise Value of the Banking Systems in the United States and Japan," IMF Working Papers 92/45, International Monetary Fund.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Biagio Bossone, 2002. "Should Banks Be Narrowed?," Economics Working Paper Archive 354, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yotopoulos, Pan A., 1997. "Financial Crises and the Benefits of Mildly Repressed Exchange Rates," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 202, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alba, Pedro & Hernandez, Leonardo & Klingebiel, Daniela, 1999. "Financial liberalization and the capital account : Thailand, 1988-97," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2188, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Demirguc-Kent, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1998. "Financial liberalization and financial fragility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1917, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Thomas F. Hellmann & Kevin C. Murdock & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Wyplosz, Charles, 1999. "Financial Restraints and Liberalization in Postwar Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Impavido, Gregorio & Musalem, Alberto R. & Tressel, Thierry, 2001. "Contractual savings institutions and banks'stability and efficiency," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2751, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Roberto Chang & Andrés Velasco, 2001. "The 1997-98 Liquidity Crisis: Asia Versus Latin America," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 120, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  9. Clarke, George R. G. & Cull, Robert & D'Amato, Laura & Molinari, Andrea, 1999. "The effect of foreign entry on Argentina's domestic banking sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2158, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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