Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Moral hazard and moral motivation: Corporate social responsibility as labor market screening

Contents:

Author Info

  • Brekke, Kjell Arne

    ()
    (The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Nyborg, Karine

    ()
    (The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

Abstract

Morally motivated individuals behave more cooperatively than predicted by standard theory. Hence,if a firm can attract workers who are strongly motivated by ethical concerns, moral hazard problems like shirking can be reduced. We show that employers may be able to use the firm’s corporate social responsibility profile as a screening device to attract more productive workers. Both pooling and separating equilibria are possible. Even when a substantial share of the workers have no moral motivation whatsoever, such screening may in fact drive every firm with a low social responsibility profile out of business.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2004/Memo-25-2004.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 25/2004.

as in new window
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 06 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Resource and Energy Economics, 2008, pages 509-526.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2004_025

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Email:
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Self-image; teamwork; shirking; voluntary abatement;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Schram, Arthur, 2000. " Sorting Out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 231-58, June.
  5. Karine Nyborg & Mari Rege, 2001. "Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods?," Discussion Papers 300, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  6. Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
  7. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  8. Nyborg, Karine, 2000. "Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: interpretation and aggregation of environmental values," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 305-322, July.
  9. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
  10. Kjell Brekke & Hilde Lurå & Karine Nyborg, 1996. "Allowing disagreement in evaluations of social welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 303-324, October.
  11. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
  12. Per-Olov Johansson, 1992. "Altruism in cost-benefit analysis," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(6), pages 605-613, November.
  13. Thomas Bue Bjorner & Lars Garn Hansen & Clifford S. Russell, 2002. "Environmental Labelling and Consumer's Choice - An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Nordic Swan," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0203, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  14. Wanki Moon & Wojciech J. Florkowski & Bernhard Brückner & Ilona Schonhof, 2002. "Willingness to Pay for Environmental Practices: Implications for Eco-Labeling," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(1), pages 88-102.
  15. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Markus Kitzmueller, 2008. "Economics and Corporate Social Responsibility," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/37, European University Institute.
  2. Kjetil Telle, 2006. "“It Pays to be Green” – A Premature Conclusion?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 195-220, November.
  3. Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2009. "Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility," TSE Working Papers 09-109, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  4. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00447028 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 240-260, Summer.
  6. Isamu Okada, 2011. "An Agent-Based Model of Sustainable Corporate Social Responsibility Activities," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 14(3), pages 4.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2004_025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rhiana Bergh-Seeley).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.