Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria: An Experimental Study

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cason, Timothy N.
  • Sharma, Tridib

Abstract

This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects play against robots that always follow recommendations, including in a control treatment in which human subjects receive the robot "earnings." This indicates that the lack of mutual knowledge of conjectures, rather than social preferences, explains subjects' failure to play the suggested correlated equilibrium when facing other human players.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd/Working-paper-series/Year-2006/1191.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Krannert PHD)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1191.

as in new window
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1191

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Krannert Building, West Lafayette, IN 47907
Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Game Theory ; Experiments ; Coordination ; Common Knowledge;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Marimon, R. & Spear, S. & Sunder, S., 1991. "Expectationally-Driven Market Volatility: An Experimental Study," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business 1991-3, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  2. Van Huyck, John B. & Gillette, Ann B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 1992. "Credible assignments in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 606-626, October.
  3. Brandts Jordi & Macleod W. Bentley, 1995. "Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 36-63, October.
  4. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 47-76, July.
  5. Yaw Nyarko & Andrew Schotter, 2002. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 971-1005, May.
  6. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  7. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996. "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
  9. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  10. Daniel Houser & Robert Kurzban, 2002. "Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1062-1069, September.
  11. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  12. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July.
  13. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  14. Offerman, Theo & Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur, 1996. "Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 817-45, July.
  15. Robert J. Aumann, 1998. "Common Priors: A Reply to Gul," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 929-938, July.
  16. Faruk Gul, 1998. "A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 923-928, July.
  17. Seely, Beth & Van Huyck, John & Battalio, Raymond, 2005. "Credible assignments can improve efficiency in laboratory public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1437-1455, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Johne Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 12-04r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  2. Dietmar Fehr & Frank Heinemann & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2011. "The Power of Sunspots: An Experimental Analysis," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_33, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00796708 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Julie Beugnot & Zeynep Gürgüç & Frederik Roose Øvlisen & Michael M. W. Roos, 2012. "Coordination failure caused by sunspots," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 2860-2869.
  5. Peter Duersch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 407-430, June.
  6. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken. An explorative experimental study," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL hal-00796708, HAL.
  7. Guillén, Pablo & Hing, Alexander, 2013. "Lying through Their Teeth: Third Party Advice and Truth Telling in a Strategy Proof Mechanism," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics 2013-11, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  8. Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
  9. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00741973 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Forgó, Ferenc, 2010. "A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 186-190, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1191. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Krannert PHD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.