The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Selling to Someone who Has Personal Valuation
AbstractThis paper provides general insight on the economic feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), in order to explain why some firms voluntarily over comply with social matters. In this paper I define CSR as the activity in which firms makes an explicit pair between the sales of private good and the provision of public good. Furthermore, the consumers are divided into two different categories; responsible consumers and non responsible ones. The main result shows that CSR activity could be considered as a firm's strategy to internalize the externality, and thus it would not be contradicted with profit maximization. Moreover, could be an alternative way for the provision of public good, especially in the presence of government failure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University in its series Working Papers in Economics and Development Studies (WoPEDS) with number 200706.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision: Jun 2007
Corporate social responsibility; public goods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
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