By-product lobbying with rival public goods
AbstractA by-product firm uses the profits from the sale of a private good to finance provision of a public good. If the public good exhibits any degree of rivalry, an increase in population will lead to a reduction in the provision of the public good, when the number of by-product firms is constant. An increase in the number of by-product firms raises provision of the public good, if population is constant. When population and the number of by-product firms are increased in the same proportion, the effect on provision of the public good depends upon the degree of rivalry exhibited by the public good.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
By-product lobbying Free-rider problem Collective action;
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