Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation
AbstractThe free rider problem is restated more precisely as the cheap rider problem. It is argued that if one takes account of the frequent or typical asymmetry in the interests of different enterprises in an industry, the individual incentives of many enterprises to participate in joint ventures are substantial.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1974)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
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- Joel M. Guttman, 1978. "Villages as Interest Groups: The Demand for Agricultural Extension Services in India," UCLA Economics Working Papers 128, UCLA Department of Economics.
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- Johan den Hertog, 2010. "Review of Economic Theories of Regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
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