Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to follow this author

Paul Pecorino

Contents:

This is information that was supplied by Paul Pecorino in registering through RePEc. If you are Paul Pecorino , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Paul
Middle Name:
Last Name: Pecorino
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: ppe37

Email:
Homepage: http://mycba.ua.edu/~ppecorin/
Postal Address: Department of Economics University of Alabama Box 870224 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
Phone: 205-348-0379

Affiliation

Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration
University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa
Location: Tuscaloosa, Alabama (United States)
Homepage: http://www.cba.ua.edu/efl/
Email:
Phone: (205)348-7842
Fax: (205)348-0590
Postal: 200 Alston Hall, Box 870224, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
Handle: RePEc:edi:defuaus (more details at EDIRC)

Works

as in new window

Working papers

  1. Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: a model of preemptive hiring," Microeconomics 0505002, EconWPA.

Articles

  1. Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark, 2014. "Bargaining with Asymmetric Dispute Costs," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 28, March.
  2. Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Monopolistic Competition and Public Good Provision with By-Product Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 875-893, December.
  3. Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Compensation for Regulatory Takings with a Redistributive Government," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 488-501, October.
  4. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Discovery and Disclosure with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 223 - 247.
  5. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2012. "Lotteries, public good provision and the degree of rivalry," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 195-202, April.
  6. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2012. "Title IX and the Allocation of Resources to Women's and Men's Sports," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 141-164.
  7. Paul Pecorino, 2011. "Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 269-289.
  8. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Is the Coach Paid too Much?: Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 841-862, 09.
  9. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information: Unilateral versus Bilateral Payoff Relevance," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 369-384, October.
  10. Pecorino, Paul, 2010. "By-product lobbying with rival public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 114-124, March.
  11. Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, 2010. "Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 263-287, 05.
  12. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 161-169, January.
  13. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 298-307, 01.
  14. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2008. "The Group Size Paradox Revisited," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 785-799, October.
  15. Paul Pecorino, 2008. "Import Protection Bias," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 341-349, 05.
  16. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 451-465, 06.
  17. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2007. "Negative Expected Value Suits in a Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 434-447, October.
  18. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 337-346, March.
  19. Paul Pecorino, 2006. "Rent Seeking: A Textbook Example," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 331-339, July.
  20. Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2006. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 475-486, December.
  21. James Peery Cover & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Price and Output Stability under Price-Level Targeting," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 152–166, July.
  22. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Civil Litigation with Mandatory Discovery and Voluntary Transmission of Private Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 137-159, 01.
  23. Gary Hoover & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 95-113, April.
  24. Cover, James P. & Pecorino, Paul, 2005. "The length of US business expansions: When did the break in the data occur?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 452-471, September.
  25. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 566-581, January.
  26. Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, 2004. "An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 131-156, 01.
  27. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul & Stango, Victor, 2004. "The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 543-68, October.
  28. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2004. "Pretrial settlement with fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 287-296, July.
  29. Paul Pecorino, 2004. "Negotiation games: applying game theory to bargaining and arbitration, rev. ed., by Brams, S. J. Routledge advances in game theory, ed. by Schmidt, C., London and New York: Routledge, 2003, xxvi &plus," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 175-176.
  30. John R. Conlon & Paul Pecorino, 2004. "Policy Reform and the Free-Rider Problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(1_2), pages 123-142, 07.
  31. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2003. "Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information: Does the Use of Final Offer Arbitration Impede Settlement?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 64-82, April.
  32. Cover James Peery & Pecorino Paul, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Policy and the Correlation between Prices and Output," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, February.
  33. Paul Pecorino, 2002. "Book Review," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 731-733, December.
  34. Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Should the US allow prescription drug reimports from Canada?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 699-708, July.
  35. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June.
  36. Pecorino, Paul & Temimi, Akram, 2001. " A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising: The Role of Refunds," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(3), pages 341-45.
  37. Pecorino, Paul, 2001. "Can by-product lobbying firms compete?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 377-397, December.
  38. Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark, 2001. "Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of A Multistage Arbitration Game," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 922-48, October.
  39. Pecorino, Paul, 2001. " Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 203-20, March.
  40. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2000. "Does jury bias matter?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 315-328, September.
  41. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
  42. Basuchoudhary, Atin & Pecorino, Paul & Shughart, William F, II, 1999. " Reversal of Fortune: The Politics and Economics of the Superconducting Supercollider," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 185-201, September.
  43. Paul Pecorino, 1999. "Endogenous Export Subsidies as a Revenue-Seeking Activity: Some Implications for the Evolution of Protection," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 785-798, May.
  44. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. " Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-88, September.
  45. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "The Response to Reform in a Growing Economy: The Role of Rent-Seeking Technology," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 167-80, June.
  46. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Bargaining with Informative Offers: An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 415-32, June.
  47. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. " Errata [Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response]," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 221, January.
  48. Conlon, John R & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Primary and Secondary Reform," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 590-602, October.
  49. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-60, June.
  50. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "A reputation for being a nuisance: frivolous lawsuits and fee shifting in a repeated play game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 147-157, June.
  51. Pecorino, Paul, 1997. "The Optimal Rate of Inflation When Capital is Taxed," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 657-673, October.
  52. Pecorino, Paul, 1997. " Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-108, July.
  53. Pecorino, Paul, 1995. "Inflation, human capital accumulation and long-run growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 533-542.
  54. Pecorino, Paul, 1995. "Tax rates and tax revenues in a model of growth through human capital accumulation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 527-539, December.
  55. Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Taxation, growth and competitiveness in a two-country mode," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 295-311.
  56. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September.
  57. Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "The Growth Rate Effects of Tax Reform," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 492-501, July.
  58. Pecorino, Paul, 1993. "Tax structure and growth in a model with human capital," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 251-271, September.
  59. Amy Farmer Curry & Paul Pecorino, 1993. "The Use of Final Offer Arbitration as a Screening Device," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 655-669, December.
  60. Pual Pecorino, 1992. "Rent Seeking and Growth: The Case of Growth through Human Capital Accumulation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(4), pages 944-56, November.

NEP Fields

1 paper by this author was announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2005-05-14. Author is listed

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  2. Number of Journal Pages
  3. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  4. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  5. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Most cited item

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Paul Pecorino should log into the RePEc Author Service

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.