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The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting

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Author Info
Pecorino, Paul

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 72 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 121-134
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:72:y:1999:i:1:p:121-134

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  2. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 337-346, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. MAHENC Philippe, 2007. "Cooperation among Overlapping Generations for a Public Project," Working Papers 07.08.229, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  5. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 161-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. DAUBANES Julien, 2009. "Changement climatique, instruments économiques et propositions pour un accord post-Kyoto : une synthèse," Working Papers 09.19.295, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  7. Roger Lagunoff & Matthew Haag, . "One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Thomas Gaube, 1999. "Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse13_2000, University of Bonn, Germany, revised May 2000. [Downloadable!]
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