Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game
AbstractWe embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways but also moves the bargaining closer to what is found in some naturally occurring settings. In this context, the ultimatum game is played over the joint surplus, which is achieved from settlement rather than a dispute. In our embedded ultimatum game, the median offer contains only 8 percent of the joint surplus from settlement. When we replicate the simple ultimatum game, we find that 50 percent of the joint surplus is contained in the median offer. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal The Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 53 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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- Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields, 2013.
"When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents,"
13-33, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2014. "When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 96-108.
- Kimbrough, Erik & Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy, 2013. "When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents," MPRA Paper 52922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields, 2013. "When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents," Working Papers 13-20, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Chris Kuo, 2013. "Billing Abuses by the Experts: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Legal Services," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 9(1), pages 13-30, January.
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