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Pretrial settlement with fairness

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  • Farmer, Amy
  • Pecorino, Paul

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  • Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2004. "Pretrial settlement with fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 287-296, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:54:y:2004:i:3:p:287-296
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2003. "Caring About Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Solution to Holdup Problems with Small Stakes," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 106-118, April.
    2. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June.
    3. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "The Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 195-206, Fall.
    4. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September.
    5. William M. Landes, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 164-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 1984. "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-56, January.
    7. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter.
    8. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
    9. Neelin, Janet & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Spiegel, Matthew, 1988. "A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 824-836, September.
    10. Binmore, Ken G & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1988. "A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 837-839, September.
    11. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    12. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    13. Binmore, Ken & Morgan, Peter & Snaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1991. "Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 295-322, August.
    14. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
    15. Barry Nalebuff, 1987. "Credible Pretrial Negotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 198-210, Summer.
    16. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    17. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
    18. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
    19. Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-1180, December.
    20. Sunstein, Cass R, 1999. "Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1-2), pages 115-157, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam, 2021. "Accident avoidance and settlement bargaining: The role of reciprocity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 18-27, March.
    3. Cédric Argenton & Xiaoyu Wang, 2023. "Litigation and settlement under loss aversion," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 369-402, October.
    4. Alberto Casagrande & Marco Spallone, 2007. "Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyers’ fees," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-13, August.
    5. Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark, 2019. "Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-32, July.
    6. Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2020. "Opting for the English rule: On the contractual re-allocation of legal fees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Éric Langlais, 2008. "Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 74(2), pages 191-218.

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