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Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties
[Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmetric information on preferences of litigant parties]

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Author Info
Langlais, Eric

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Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation round. Then, we focuse on the comparative statics of the model and analyse the role of the choice of a cost allocation rule. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the assumption on the representation of preferences, and the role of self-serving bias.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1150/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1150.

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Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision: 06 Nov 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1150

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Related research
Keywords: litigation asymmetric information on preferences self-serving bias

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ioana Marinescu, 2008. "Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from UK Employment Tribunals," Working Papers 0802, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2004. "Pretrial settlement with fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 287-296, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Louis Kaplow, 1993. "Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 625-630, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Yi, Jong Goo, 1993. "The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 399-424, October.
  8. Yaari, Menahem E, 1987. "The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 95-115, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. W. Kip Viscusi, 1995. "Insurance and catastrophes: The changing role of the liability system," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 177-184, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roell, Ailsa A, 1987. "Risk Aversion in Quiggin and Yaari's Rank-Order Model of Choice under Uncertainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388a), pages 143-59, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 667-81, June.
  13. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2000. "Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 821-35, June.
  14. Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003. "Are judges biased by labor market conditions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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