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Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties

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Author Info
Éric Langlais

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Abstract

This paper studies in a model à la Bebchuk how the existence of an asymmetric information on the risk aversion of parties engaged in a trial affects the way they litigate. We first consider the situation where the plaintiff is the informed party, and solve for the equilibrium with and without pre-trial negotiations. Then, we analyze the comparative static of the model and the effects of alternative fee-shfting rules. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the representation of litigants? preferences, and of the existence of the optimistic bias (or self-serving bias). JEL Classification: D81, K42.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.

Volume (Year): 74 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 191-218
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Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_742_0191

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Related research
Keywords: litigations; asymmetric information; bias in risk perception;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Ioana Marinescu, 2008. "Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from UK Employment Tribunals," Working Papers 0802, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2004. "Pretrial settlement with fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 287-296, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Louis Kaplow, 1993. "Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 625-630, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Yi, Jong Goo, 1993. "The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 399-424, October.
  8. Yaari, Menahem E, 1987. "The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 95-115, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. W. Kip Viscusi, 1995. "Insurance and catastrophes: The changing role of the liability system," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 177-184, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roell, Ailsa A, 1987. "Risk Aversion in Quiggin and Yaari's Rank-Order Model of Choice under Uncertainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388a), pages 143-59, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 667-81, June.
  13. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2000. "Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 821-35, June.
  14. Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003. "Are judges biased by labor market conditions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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