Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils
Abstract
According to several studies, agricultural carbon sequestration could be a relatively low cost opportunity to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration and a promising means that could be institutionalised. However the potential for additional carbon quantities in agricultural soils is critical and comes from the agricultural firms behaviour with regards to land heterogeneity. In this paper, our aim is to set incentive mechanisms to enhance carbon sequestration by agricultural firms. A policymaker has to arrange incentives as agricultural firms have private information and do not spontaneously switch to the required practices. Moreover, a novelty in our paper is to show that the potential for additional carbon sequestration is similar to an exhaustible resource. As a result, we construct an intertemporal principal-agent model with adverse selection. Our contribution is to specify contracts in order to induce truthful revelation by the firms regarding their intrinsic characteristics towards carbon sequestration, while analytically characterizing the optimal path to sequester carbon as an exhaustible resource.Download Info
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00505137.Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00505137
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00505137
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Related research
Keywords: Adverse selection ; agriculture ; carbon sequestration ; incentives ; land-use;Other versions of this item:
- Mireille CHIROLEU-ASSOULINE & Sébastien ROUSSEL, 2010. "Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils," Working Papers 10-07, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jul 2010.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Sébastien Roussel, 2010. "Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10060, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-07-31 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-07-31 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENE-2010-07-31 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-07-31 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-07-31 (Regulation)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- de Cara, Stephane & Rozakis, Stelios, 2004. "Carbon sequestration through the planting of multi-annual energy crops: A dynamic and spatial assessment," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 5(1), January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012.
"North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
halshs-00747405, HAL.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Working Papers 2012.89, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12059, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Working Papers 12-31, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2012.
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