Procurement Auctions with Entry of Bidders
AbstractIn procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort. If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing the firms' rent may imply reduced entry.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 215.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
More information through EDIRC
AUCTIONS ; CONTRACTS ; INCENTIVES;
Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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