Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments -
AbstractTo explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games, one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputation effects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hitherto experimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded. Our experimental design eliminates all strategic factors and allows to focus on the effects of communication processes. We clearly find social effects, but none of revealed anonymity or salient communication. The social processes invoked are very heterogeneous but not irregular for different communicators.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2005-18.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ben Greiner & Werner Güth & Ro'i Zultan, 2005. "Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments -," Working Paper Series in Economics 18, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- Ben Greiner & Werner Guth & Ro’i Zultan, 2005. "Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments," Discussion Paper Series dp396, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-08-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-08-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-08-13 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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