There is growing evidence of systematic heterogeneity in behavior by observable characteristics, such as what one would see in a face. We ask, is there informational value in knowing these characteristics in a strategic interaction? Subjects are given the opportunity to purchase a photograph of their partner in the play of a trust game. Not everyone purchases the photo, even at prices as low as $0.20. Senders (first movers in the game) have a more inelastic demand for pictures than responders (second movers). White senders have a substantially higher demand than nonwhite senders or responders. For responders, there is no difference in demand for pictures across ethnicity or sex. White senders who pay to see the picture of their partner use the information to discriminate, sending significantly less to black responders than to white responders. Overall, responders return a higher percentage of the amount received as offers go up, but they do differentiate that percentage when they see the picture of the sender, returning more to a member of the same ethnicity. A face, it appears, has strategic value, especially for those who will use the information to differentiate their decisions.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Hamermesh, Daniel S & Biddle, Jeff E, 1994.
"Beauty and the Labor Market,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1174-94, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Manuel Amador & Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2006.
"Commitment vs. Flexibility,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 365-396, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Manuel Amador & Ivan Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2003.
"Commitment Vs. Flexibility,"
NBER Working Papers
10151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Markus M. Mobius & Tanya S. Rosenblat, 2006.
"Why Beauty Matters,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 222-235, March.
[Downloadable!]
Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".