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Communication channels and induced behavior

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Author Info
Brosig, Jeannette

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Abstract

This paper reports recent findings on the effects of cheap talk communication on behavior. It exemplifies how different communication channels influence decisions in various games and information environments and addresses possible consequences for the design of real-world economic environments.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14035/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14035.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14035

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Related research
Keywords: communication; economic experiment; bargaining; public good;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  6. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  10. Schmidt, Carsten & Zultan, Ro´i, 2005. "The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-29, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Loomes, Graham & Sugden, Robert, 1982. "Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 805-24, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Axel Ockenfels, 2003. "The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 217-241, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Chun-Lei Yang & Joachim Weimann & Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2006. "An Alternative Approach To Explaining Bargaining Behaviour In Simple Sequential Games," Pacific Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 201-221, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Jeannette Brosig & Axel Ockenfels & Joachim Weimann, 2003. "Information and Communication in Sequential Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-09, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  16. Mark Isaac, R. & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., 1985. "Public goods provision in an experimental environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-74, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Gary E. Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2003. "How Effective are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper Series in Economics 3, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Loomes, Graham & Sugden, Robert, 1987. "Some implications of a more general form of regret theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 270-287, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H., 2002. "How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 127-155, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Carsten Schmidt & Ro`i Zultan, 2004. "Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment," Discussion Paper Series dp369, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Grether, David M & Isaac, R Mark & Plott, Charles R, 1981. "The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 166-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Bodo Sturm & Joachim Weimann, 2006. "Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(3), pages 419-457, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

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