Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence
AbstractThis paper studies the role of communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder’s probability of winning the auction. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen in its series Ruhr Economic Papers with number 0253.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Heinrich, Timo, 2012. "Communication and reputation in procurement auctions — Some empirical evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 164-167.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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