Communication and reputation in procurement auctions — Some empirical evidence
AbstractThis paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder’s probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 114 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Communication; Procurement auctions; Reputation;
Other versions of this item:
- Timo Heinrich, 2011. "Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence," Ruhr Economic Papers 0253, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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