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Courage to Capital? A Model of the Effects of Rating Agencies on Sovereign Debt Role-over

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Abstract

We propose a model of rating agencies that is an application of global game theory in which heterogeneous investors act strategically. The model allows us to explore the impact of the introduction of a rating agency on financial markets. Our model suggests that the addition of the rating agency affects the probability of default and the magnitude of the response of capital flows to changes in fundamentals in a non–trivial way, and that introducing a rating agency can bring multiple equilibria to a market that otherwise would have the unique equilibrium.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15a/d1506.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1506.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1506

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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Keywords: Credit rating; Rating agency; Sovereign debt; Global game;

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References

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  1. Arnoud W. A. Boot & Todd T. Milbourn, 2002. "Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 457, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  2. Helmut Reisen & Julia Maltzan, 1998. "Sovereign credit ratings, emerging market risk and financial market volatility," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 73-82, March.
  3. Jeremy A.Rogoff Bulow & Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 43, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  4. Allen, Franklin, 1990. "The market for information and the origin of financial intermediation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-30, March.
  5. repec:att:wimass:8813 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Does one Soros make a difference?: a theory of currency crises with large and small traders," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25045, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Marcia H. Millon & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies," Finance 0411024, EconWPA.
  8. Roman Kraeussl, 2003. "Sovereign Credit Ratings and Their Impact on Recent Financial Crises," International Finance 0311013, EconWPA.
  9. Gande, Amar & Parsley, David C., 2005. "News spillovers in the sovereign debt market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 691-734, March.
  10. Graciela Kaminsky & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2002. "Emerging Market Instability: Do Sovereign Ratings Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 16(2), pages 171-195, August.
  11. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, 1996. "Determinants and impact of sovereign credit ratings," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 37-53.
  12. Con Keating & Hyun Song Shin & Charles Goodhart & Jon Danielsson, 2001. "An Academic Response to Basel II," FMG Special Papers sp130, Financial Markets Group.
  13. Ferri, Giovanni & Li-Gang Liu & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2000. "How the proposd Basel Guidelines on rating-agency assessments would affect developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2369, The World Bank.
  14. Christina E. Bannier, 2003. "Private and Public Information in Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises," International Finance 0309006, EconWPA.
  15. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 16(2), pages 151-170, August.
  16. Glick, Reuven & Rose, Andrew K, 1998. "Contagion and Trade: Why are Currency Crises Regional," CEPR Discussion Papers 1947, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
  18. Roberto Chang, 2005. "Financial Crises and Political Crises," NBER Working Papers 11779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Shin, Hyun, 2000. "Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1273, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  20. Blum, Jurg & Hellwig, Martin, 1995. "The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy requirements for banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 739-749, April.
  21. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Coordination and Policy Traps," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000294, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  23. Guillermo Larraín & Helmut Reisen & Julia von Maltzan, 1997. "Emerging Market Risk and Sovereign Credit Ratings," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 124, OECD Publishing.
  24. Mora, Nada, 2006. "Sovereign credit ratings: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 2041-2062, July.
  25. Allan Drazen, 1999. "Political Contagion in Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 7211, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Seth B. Carpenter & William Whitesell & Egon Zakrajsek, 2001. "Capital requirements, business loans, and business cycles: an empirical analysis of the standardized approach in the new Basel Capital Accord," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-48, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  27. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marco Di Maggio, 2007. "Information sharing in emerging credit markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(37), pages 1-7.
  2. Dion Bongaerts & K.J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2009. "Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings," NBER Working Papers 15331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Christopher F. Baum & Margarita Karpava & Dorothea Schäfer & Andreas Stephan, 2013. "Credit Rating Agency Downgrades and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crises," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 841, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 30 Jan 2014.
  4. Christopher F. Baum & Margarita Karpava & Dorothea Schäfer & Andreas Stephan, 2013. "Credit Rating Agency Announcements and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1333, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:37:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Sanne Zwart, 2005. "Liquidity runs with endogenous information acquisition," Economics Working Papers ECO2005/18, European University Institute.
  7. Gärtner, Manfred & Griesbach, Björn, 2012. "Rating agencies, self-fulfilling prophecy and multiple equilibria? An empirical model of the European sovereign debt crisis 2009-2011," Economics Working Paper Series 1215, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  8. Bussière, M. & Ristiniemi, A., 2012. "Credit Ratings and Debt Crises," Working papers 396, Banque de France.

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