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Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms

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Author Info
Arnoud W. A. Boot
Todd T. Milbourn
Anjolein Schmeits

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Abstract

In this article, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose is that credit ratings serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a "focal point" for firms and their investors, and explore the vital, but previously overlooked implicit contractual relationship between a credit rating agency (CRA) and a firm through its credit watch procedures. Credit ratings can help fix the desired equilibrium and as such play an economically meaningful role. Our model provides several empirical predictions and insights regarding the expected price impact of rating changes. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhj009
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 19 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 81-118
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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:19:y:2006:i:1:p:81-118

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 214-231, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Doron Kliger & Oded Sarig, 2000. "The Information Value of Bond Ratings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2879-2902, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Pamela Nickell & William Perraudin & Simone Varotto, . "Ratings versus equity-based credit risk modelling: an empirical analysis," Bank of England working papers 132, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  5. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, . "Capital Budgeting and Delegation," CRSP working papers 343, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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  7. Ederington, Louis H. & Goh, Jeremy C., 1998. "Bond Rating Agencies and Stock Analysts: Who Knows What When?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 569-585, December. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. " The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Cantor, Richard & Packer, Frank, 1997. "Differences of opinion and selection bias in the credit rating industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1395-1417, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Mark Carey & Mark Hrycay, 2000. "Parameterizing credit risk models with rating data," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-47, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  16. Spatt, Chester & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(4), pages 709-26. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Marco Da Rin & Thomas Hellmann, 2001. "Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 443, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Douglas Gale, 1992. "Informational Capacity and Financial Collapse," Papers 0038, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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  19. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Forster, Josef, 2008. "The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies," Discussion Papers in Economics 5169, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mark A. Carlson & Galina B. Hale, 2005. "Courage to Capital? A Model of the Effects of Rating Agencies on Sovereign Debt Role-over," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1506, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, 2008. "Reputation and competition: evidence from the credit rating industry," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-051, Harvard Business School, revised Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
  4. Elsas, Ralf & Florysiak, David, 2008. "Empirical Capital Structure Research: New Ideas, Recent Evidence, and Methodological Issues," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4743, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dion Bongaerts & K.J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2009. "Multiple Ratings and Credit Spreads," NBER Working Papers 15331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Timo Baas & Mechthild Schrooten, 2006. "‘Relationship Banking and SMEs: A Theoretical Analysis’," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 127-137, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Christina E. Bannier & Marcel Tyrell, 2005. "Modelling the role of credit rating agencies - Do they spark off a virtuous circle?," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 160, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  8. Christina E. Bannier & Christian Hirsch, 2008. "The Economics of Rating Watchlists: Evidence from Rating Changes," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 184, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ari Hyytinen & Mika Pajarinen, 2004. "Opacity of Young Firms: Faith or Fact?," Discussion Papers 923, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hartarska, Valentina, 2006. "Rating in Microfinance: Cross-Country Evidence," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25506, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  11. Meuleman, M. & De Maeseneire, W., 2008. "Do R&D subsidies affect SME's: access to external financing," Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School Working Paper Series 2008-12, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School. [Downloadable!]
  12. Christina E. Bannier & Falko Fecht & Marcel Tyrell, 2008. "Open-End Real Estate Funds in Germany - Genesis and Crisis," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 165, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
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  13. repec:bep:mactop:v:6:y:2006:i:2:p:1375-1375 is not listed on IDEAS
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