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Punishment - and beyond

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  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

This paper argues that the “Economics of Crime” concentrates too much on punishment as a policy to fight crime, which is unwise for several reasons. There are important instances in which punishment simply cannot reduce crime. Several feasible alternatives to punishment exist, such as offering positive incentives or handing out awards for law abiding behavior. These alternative approaches tend to create a positive sum environment. When people appreciate living in a society that is to a large extent law abiding, they are more motivated to observe the law.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2009/wp-cesifo-2009-07/cesifo1_wp2706.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2706.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2706

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Keywords: crime; punishment; incentives; motivation; framing; broken window theory;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Yu-Fu Chen & Michael Funke, 2010. "Booms, Recessions And Financial Turmoil: A Fresh Look At Investment Decisions Under Cyclical Uncertainty," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(s1), pages 290-317, 07.
  2. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  3. Chen, Yu-Fu & Funke, Michael, 2009. "Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2009-31, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

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