A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation
AbstractFrom 1997 to 2005, an astonishing 5200Â million USD was invested to reduce cocaine production in Colombia, the world's main cocaine producer. However, little is known about the effectiveness of policies targeting coca cultivation. This paper uses a survey-based experiment to evaluate the effects of the two main policies: eradication and alternative development programs. Our results support Becker's (1968) model of crime participation and in addition shed light on other non-monetary factors that affect the coca cultivation decision: religion, legitimacy, remoteness, and poverty are found to be important. We find that coca cultivation is inelastic to increases in perceived risk and relative profit so eradication and alternative development would have a rather small effect on coca cultivation. A simple simulation exercise predicts that investing additional hundred thousand dollars in eradication decreases coca cultivation in only 1.5%.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 93 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec
Illegal drugs Choice experiment Colombia Crime;
Other versions of this item:
- Marcela Ibanez & Fredrik Carlsson, 2009. "A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 17, Courant Research Centre PEG.
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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