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The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Francesco Drago
Roberto Galbiati
Pietro Vertova
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The Collective Clemency Bill passed by the Italian Parliament in July 2006 represents a natural experiment to analyze the behavioral response of individuals to an exogenous manipulation of prison sentences. On the basis of a unique data set on the postrelease behavior of former inmates, we find that 1 month less time served in prison commuted into 1 month more in expected sentence for future crimes reduces the probability of recidivism by 0.16 percentage points. From this result we estimate an elasticity of average recidivism with respect to the expected punishment equal to - 0.74 for a 7-month period. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy .
Volume (Year): 117 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 257-280
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:117:y:2009:i:2:p:257-280Contact details of provider: Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Fax: (773) 753-0811 Email: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/home.html
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Maurin, Eric & Ouss, Aurelie, 2009.
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Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009.
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NRN working papers
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"Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information ,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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"Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information ,"
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2009-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
[Downloadable!]
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