1. Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, 1999. "Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1014, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Harel, Alon & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1-2), pages 276-312, Fall.
2. Nuno Garoupa, 1998. "Crime and Punishment: Further Results," Economics Working Papers 344, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
3. Robert Cooter, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. David Friedman, 1999. "Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S259-S269, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Orit Perry & Ido Erev & Ernan Haruvy, 2002. "Frequent probabilistic punishment in law enforcement," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 71-86, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Sunstein, Cass R & Schkade, David A & Kahneman, Daniel, 2000. "Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 237-53, January.
8. Kahan, Dan M, 1998. "Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 609-22, June.
9. Hey, John D & Orme, Chris, 1994. "Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1291-1326, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Sunstein, Cass R, 1999. "Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1-2), pages 115-57, Fall.
11. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 585-608, June.
12. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
13. Field, Alexander James, 1991. "Do legal systems matter?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, 2002. "Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis," Working papers 2002-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 185-207.
15. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Harless, David W & Camerer, Colin F, 1994. "The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1251-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-43, October.
    Other versions:
    • Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality''," Law and Economics 9506001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Rasmusen, E., 1992. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Papers 92-019, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
18. Neilson, William S, 1998. "Optimal Punishment Schemes with State-Dependent Preferences," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 266-71, April.
19. Robert Cooter, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1051, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Norbert Hirschauer & Stefan Zwoll, 2008. "Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 27-60, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Hirschauer, Norbert & Zwoll, Stefan, 2006. "Understanding and Managing Behavioural Risks -The Case of Food Risks Caused by Malpractice in Poultry Production," Working Paper Series 10287, Humboldt University Berlin, Institute for Agricultural Economic and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
3. Bigoni, Maria & Le Coq, Chloé & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Risk Aversion, Prospect Theory, and Strategic Risk in Law Enforcement: Evidence From an Antitrust Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 696, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. George Saridakis, 2004. "Violent Crime in the United States of America: A Time-Series Analysis Between 1960–2000," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 203-221, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)