This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jean-Robert Tyran
Lars P. Feld

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Law backed by non-deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e. self-imposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2005-17.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Full Text
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://www.crema-research.ch/abstracts/2005-17.htm
File Format: text/html
File Function: Abstract
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2005-17.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2005-17

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Gellerstrasse 24, 4052 Basel
Email:
Web page: http://www.crema-research.ch
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Anna-Lea Werlen).

Related research
Keywords: Deterrent effect of legal sanctions; Expressive law; Social norms; Public goods; Voting;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van der Weele, 2009. "Can Sanctions Induce Pessimism? An Experiment," Economics Working Papers 1150, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Christian Traxler & Joachim Winter, 2009. "Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Visser, Martine & Burns, Justine, 2006. "Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers in Economics 219, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rockenbach, Bettina & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Institution design in social dilemmas: How to design if you must?," MPRA Paper 16922, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Legal versus Normative Incentives under Judicial Error," Cahiers de recherche 0718, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Research Memoranda 029, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Werner Güth & Rupert Sausgruber, 2008. "Voting between tax regimes to fund a public good," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 287-303, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hörisch, Hannah & Strassmair, Christina, 2008. "An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis," Discussion Papers in Economics 2139, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.