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Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated

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Author Info
Lars P. Feld
Bruno S. Frey

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Abstract

Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or “psychological” contract. Studies on tax evasion in Switzerland show that the more strongly the political participation rights are developed, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. In this paper, empirical evidence based on a survey of tax authorities of the 26 Swiss states (cantons) is presented, indicating that the differences in the treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities can be explained by differences in political participation rights as well. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s101010100032
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
Pages: 87-99
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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:87-99

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Related research
Keywords: Key words: tax evasion; tax authority; tax compliance; direct democracy; JEL classification: H26; H73; D73; D78;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  26. Albrecht Ritschl & Ulrich Woitek, . "Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? A Bayesian VAR Analysis for the U.S. Economy," IEW - Working Papers iewwp050, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Feld, Lars P., 2000. "Steuerwettbewerb und seine Auswirkungen auf Allokation und Distribution. Ein Überblick und eine empirische Analyse für die Schweiz," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 10, number urn:isbn:9783161473852, September.
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  29. Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CEPR Discussion Papers 2790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  30. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Bruno Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2001. "Beyond Bentham -- Measuring Procedural Utility," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  32. Rabah Amir & Igor V. Evstigneev & Thorsten Hens & Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé, . "Market Selection and Survival of Investment Strategies," IEW - Working Papers iewwp091, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  33. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers iewwp052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  34. Ernste, Dominik & Schneider, Friedrich, 1998. "Increasing Shadow Economies all over the World - Fiction or Reality?," IZA Discussion Papers 26, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  36. Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, . "A Proposal for a Flexible Europe," IEW - Working Papers iewwp056, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  37. Bruno Frey, 2001. "Flexible Citizenship for a Global Society," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1018, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  38. Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, . "Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Form," IEW - Working Papers iewwp027, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  39. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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