Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?
AbstractWhile there is an extensive literature on tax evasion a further aspect of cheating on the state, namely benefit fraud, has gained relatively modest attention in the economic literature. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We explore differences between benefit fraud and tax evasion due to differing social norms. We define the concepts of benefit morale and tax morale as the motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via these two offenses. Our multilevel analysis, based on a large micro data set of respondents from 29 OECD member countries, shows that benefit morale and tax morale have different determinants at an individual-level and respond differently to fiscal policy measures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3536.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Martin Halla & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2005. "Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?," Economics working papers 2005-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2008-07-14 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2008-07-14 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2008-07-14 (Public Finance)
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