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Is the Welfare State Self-destructive? A Study of Government Benefit Morale

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Heinemann, Friedrich

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Abstract

Assar Lindbeck has pointed to the problem that generous welfare state institutions may in the long-run undermine those social norms which limit the costs and incentives effects of the welfare state and thus guarantee its viability. This study is the first to assess the empirical validity of Lindbeck?s notion by assessing the long-run link between the welfare state and social norms with regard to the honest take-up of government benefits. Based on the results of four waves of the World Value Surveys the determinants of benefit morale ? defined as the reluctance to claim government benefits without legal entitlement ? are analysed. Besides a standard list of the respondents? individual characteristics, macroeconomic indicators describing a country?s long-run welfare state and labour market history are included. The results support the empirical validity of Lindbeck?s theory: An increase of government benefits and unemployment is in the long-run associated with deteriorating welfare state ethics. --

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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 07-029.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5688

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Related research
Keywords: benefit morale; tax morale; welfare state reforms;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  2. Lindbeck, Assar, 1995. " Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(4), pages 477-94, December.
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  3. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(3), pages 762-800, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2002. "Fractionalization," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1959, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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    • Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto & Devleeschauwer, Arnaud & Easterly, William & Kurlat, Sergio, 2002. "Fractionalization," Research Papers 1744, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    • Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2003. "Fractionalization," NBER Working Papers 9411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Alesina, Alberto, et al, 2003. " Fractionalization," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 155-94, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Torgler, Benno, 2002. " Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(5), pages 657-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Halla, Martin & Schneider, Friedrich, 2008. "Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?," IZA Discussion Papers 3536, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Alm, James & Torgler, Benno, 2006. "Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 224-246, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Andrei Shleifer & Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez de Silanes, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm355, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Benno Torgler, 2003. "Tax Morale and Institutions," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, 2006. "Civic Attitudes and the Design of Labor Market Institutions: Which Countries Can Implement the Danish Flexicurity Model?," IZA Discussion Papers 1928, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  12. Lindbeck, A. & Nyberg, S., 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 557, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hennighausen, Tanja & Heinemann, Friedrich & Bischoff, Ivo, 2008. "Individual Determinants of Social Fairness Assessments: The Case of Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-063, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Halla, Martin & Schneider, Friedrich, 2008. "Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?," IZA Discussion Papers 3536, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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