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Beyond Punishment: a tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica

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  • Benno Torgler

    ()
    (University of Basel, Switzerland)

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    Abstract

    Tax compliance experiments have been conducted with students and have focused on the effects of deterrence on tax compliance. However, important insights can be gained looking at alternative instruments. A main purpose of this paper is to conduct an experiment in Costa Rica not with students (exclusively) but with taxpayers, holding traditional factors, such as the probability of penalty and the fine rate, constant and thus analyzing to which extent other factors as fiscal exchange, moral suasion, and positive rewards systematically influence tax compliance. Our findings indicate that these factors increase ceteris paribus the compliance rate.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its journal Revista de Analisis Economico.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 1 (June)
    Pages: 27-56

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    Handle: RePEc:ila:anaeco:v:18:y:2003:i:1:p:27-56

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    Related research

    Keywords: Tax morale; tax compliance; tax evasion; experiments;

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    References

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    Cited by:
    1. Yano, Yuki & Blandford, David, 2008. "Use of Penalties and Rewards in Agri-Environmental Policy," 82nd Annual Conference, March 31 - April 2, 2008, Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester, UK 36873, Agricultural Economics Society.
    2. Juan Carlos Molero & Francesc Pujol, 2005. "Walking inside the Potential Tax Evader's Mind," Faculty Working Papers 01/05, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    3. Juan Molero & Francesc Pujol, 2012. "Walking Inside the Potential Tax Evader’s Mind: Tax Morale Does Matter," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 151-162, January.
    4. Cécile Bazart & Michael Pickhardt, 2009. "Fighting Income Tax Evasion with Positive Rewards: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 09-01, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2009.

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