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Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain

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Author Info
Richard Belfield
David Marsden
Abstract

Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show thatincentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain thisfinding in terms of the 'beneficial constraint' arising from stronger employment protection inFrance, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activitiesin France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; andgovernment fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduces the cost of its operation.

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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0941.

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Date of creation: Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0941

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Related research
Keywords: incentive systems; merit pay; profit-sharing; employer networks;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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  1. Robert McNabb, 2001. "Job Evaluation and High Performance Work Practices: Compatible or Conflictual?," Journal of Management Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(2), pages 293-312, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Francis Green, 2008. "Leeway for the Loyal: A Model of Employee Discretion," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics, vol. 46(1), pages 1-32, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, 1998. "The Last American Shoe Manufacturers: Changing the Method of Pay to Survive Foreign Competition," NBER Working Papers 6750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Finegold, David & Soskice, David, 1988. "The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 21-53, Autumn.
  5. Gregg, P. A. & Machin, S. J., 1988. "Unions and the incidence of performance linked pay schemes in Britain," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 91-107, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. John Godard, 2004. "A Critical Assessment of the High-Performance Paradigm," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 349-378, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michelle Brown & John S. Heywood, 2005. "Performance Appraisal Systems: Determinants and Change," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics, vol. 43(4), pages 659-679, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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