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L'impact des dispositifs collectifs de partage des bénéfices sur les rémunérations en France. Une analyse empirique sur la période 1999-2007

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Author Info

  • Noélie Delahaie

    (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales - IRES)

  • Richard Duhautois

    (CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - CNRS : FR3435 - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée (UPEMLV))

Abstract

En France, les dispositifs collectifs de partage des bénéfices - intéressement et participation aux bénéfices - sont des mécanismes qui permettent la constitution d'une épargne salariale. D'après les résultats de l'enquête PIPA (Participation, Intéressement, Plan d'épargne entreprise et Actionnariat des salariés) menée par la Dares depuis 1999, l'épargne salariale connaît une diffusion croissante dans les entreprises. En 2010, plus de 57 % des salariés du secteur marchand non agricole étaient concernés par au moins un dispositif. En raison de l'obligation légale de mise en œuvre dans les entreprises de 50 salariés ou plus, la participation aux bénéfices demeure le dispositif le plus répandu et concerne 44,8 % des salariés en 2010, contre 38,1 % en 1999. Sur la même période, la part des salariés couverts par un accord d'intéressement passe de 27,4 % à 37,3 %. Dans la littérature économique, les enjeux de l'épargne salariale, et surtout de l'intéressement, en termes d'incitation à l'effort sont bien documentés : la majorité des travaux observe des effets positifs de ce dispositif sur la productivité du travail. En revanche, les effets sur les salaires font l'objet d'un nombre plus réduit d'études, notamment sur des données françaises et sur la période récente. Dans ce contexte, quel est l'impact des dispositifs collectifs de partage des bénéfices (intéressement et participation aux bénéfices) sur les salaires en France entre 1999 et 2007 ? Les dispositifs collectifs de partage des bénéfices et les primes auxquelles ils donnent lieu se substituent-ils aux augmentations de salaire ? Ou bien sont-ils complémentaires ?

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00967479.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00967479

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Keywords: partage du profit; intéressement; participation; salaires.;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Michaël Zemmour, 2013. "Les dépenses socio-fiscales ayant trait à la protection sociale : état des lieux," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6o65lgig8d0, Sciences Po.

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