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Le partage du profit incite-t-il à travailler plus ?

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick Artus
  • François Legendre
  • Pierre Morin

Abstract

[eng] Is profit-sharing an incentive to work more? . by Patrick Artus, François Legendre, Pierre Morin.. . This article presents three empirical studies that attempt to assess the impact of profit-sharing on labor productivity. An especially detailed account is given of the study conducted on French data. This study conducted on French data is more completely accounted for. The studies do not examine profit-sharing — as, for example, M. Weitzman does — from a macroeconomic point of view as an activity stabilizer. Rather, profit-sharing is analyzed microeconomically as a work incentive for employees. This approach fits in with theories of the efficiency wage. In particular, the article discusses the need for such collective incentives. [fre] Le partage du profit incite-t-il à travailler plus ? . par Patrick Artus, François Legendre, Pierre Morin.. . Cet article présente, en détaillant plus particulièrement celui mené sur données françaises, trois travaux empiriques qui cherchent, à partir de données individuelles d'entreprises, à apprécier l'impact du partage du profit sur la productivité du travail. Ce mode de rémunération n'est ainsi pas examiné d'un point de vue macroéconomique de stabilisation de l'actiyité, comme le fait par exemple M. Weitzman, mais d'un point de vue microéconomique d'incitation à l'effort au travail des salariés, rejoignant en cela les théories du salaire d'efficience. La nécessité de telles incitations collectives est notamment discutée. [ger] Bietet die Gewinnverteilung einen Anreiz zu erhohter Arbeitsleistung ? . von Patrick Artus, François Legendre, Pierre Morin.. . Dieser Beitrag stellt drei empirische Ansätze vor, die anhand von firmenindiyiduellen Daten yersuchen, die Auswirkung der Gewinnverteilung auf die Arbeitsproduktivität einzuschätzen. Dabei wird die Studie über die französischen Datenerhebungen detaillierter angesprochen. Diese Entlohnungsweise wird also nicht unter dem Gesichtspunkt der makroökonomischen Stabilisierung untersucht, wie zum Beispiel Weitzman vorgeht, sondern unter dem mikroökonomischen Blickwinkel des Anreizes zum optimalen Arbeitseinsatz. Es schließt sich damit den Effizienzlohntheorien an. Unter anderem wird die Notwendigkeit solcher kollektiven Anreize erörtet. [spa] ? Acaso el reparto del beneficio incita a trabajar mas ? . por Patrick Artus, François Legendre, Pierre Morin.. . Este artículo présenta tres trabajos empíricos, exponiéndose con todo detalle en particular el efectuado en base a datos franceses, que pretenden, a partir de datos individuales de empresas, apreciar el impacto del reparto del beneficio sobre la productividad del trabajo. No se examina este modo de remuneración desde un punto de vista macroeconómico de estabilización de la actividad, como la hace por ejemplo M. Weitzman, sino màs bien desde un punto de vista microeconómico de incitación al esfuerzo al trabajo de los asalariados, acercàndose en ello a las teorías del salario de eficiencia. En particular se somete a discusión la necesidad de taies incitaciones colectivas.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Artus & François Legendre & Pierre Morin, 1989. "Le partage du profit incite-t-il à travailler plus ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 87(1), pages 105-111.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1989_num_87_1_6064
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1989.6064
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1989.6064
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Felix R. FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, 1987. "Cooperation, Productivity, and Profit Sharing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 23-35.
    2. Jones, Derek C & Svejnar, Jan, 1985. "Participation, Profit Sharing, Worker Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Cooperative," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 52(208), pages 449-465, November.
    3. Weitzman, Martin L, 1985. "The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 937-953, December.
    4. Patrick Artus, 1988. "Le partage du profit: fondements microéconomiques et effets macroéconomiques," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 10, pages 45-73.
    5. Félix Fitzroy & Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, 1988. "Entreprise et emploi dans une économie de partage," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 3(1), pages 21-50.
    6. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    7. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    8. repec:adr:anecst:y:1991:i:22:p:02 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:adr:anecst:y:1988:i:10:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1998. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 1(2), pages 57-88, June.
    2. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 2001. "Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Value Versus Shareholder Value," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(2), pages 107-128, June.
    3. Noélie Delahaie & Richard Duhautois, 2013. "L'impact des dispositifs collectifs de partage des bénéfices sur les rémunérations en France. Une analyse empirique sur la période 1999-2007," Working Papers halshs-00967479, HAL.

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