Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Leeway for the Loyal: A Model of Employee Discretion

Contents:

Author Info

  • Francis Green

Abstract

This article examines the factors underlying task discretion from an economist's perspective. It argues that the key axis for understanding discretion is the trade-off between the positive effects of discretion on potential output per employee and the negative effects of greater leeway on work effort. In empirical analysis using matched employer-employee data, it is shown that discretion is strongly affected by the level of employee commitment. In addition, discretion is generally greater in high-skilled jobs, although not without exceptions, and lower where employees are under-skilled. Homeworking and flexitime policies raise employee discretion. The impact of teamworking is mixed. In about half of cases team members do not jointly decide about work matters, and the net effect of teams on task discretion in these cases is negative. In other cases, where team members do decide matters jointly, the impact is found to be neutral according to employees' perceptions, or positive according to managers' perceptions. There are also significant and substantial unobserved establishment-level factors which affect task discretion. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2008.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2007.00666.x
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by London School of Economics in its journal British Journal of Industrial Relations.

Volume (Year): 46 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 1-32

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:46:y:2008:i:1:p:1-32

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0007-1080
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0007-1080

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2012. "Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 20128, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. William Brown & David Marsden, 2010. "Individualisation and Growing Diversity of Employment Relationships," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp1037, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  3. Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2009. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp0941, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  4. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2014. "Do People Stand by their Commitments? Evidence from Classroom Experiments," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis 2014-03, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
  5. David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2009. "Institutions and the management of human resources: incentive pay systems in France and Great Britain," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 25423, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Jones, Melanie K. & Latreille, Paul L. & Sloane, Peter J., 2011. "Job Anxiety, Work-Related Psychological Illness and Workplace Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 5809, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. David Marsden, 2011. "Individual Voice in Employment Relationships: A Comparison Under Different Forms of Workplace Representation," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp1070, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  8. David Marsden, 2010. "Individual Voice in Employment Relationships: A Comparison Under Different Collective Voice Regimes," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp1006, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:46:y:2008:i:1:p:1-32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.