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Variable Pay and Collective Bargaining in British Retail Banking

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  • James Arrowsmith
  • Paul Marginson

Abstract

The growth of variable pay schemes (VPS) appears to threaten collective approaches to pay determination, which are based on standardization and centralization. This article utilizes case study research to analyse the still little-known relationship between collective bargaining and VPS. It focuses on the retail banking sector, where trade union representation and collective bargaining remain relatively robust. The research identifies an emergent process whereby the growth of bonus schemes has both supplanted collective profit‐share and permitted greater standardization of merit‐pay awards. Unions have therefore achieved some success in terms of limiting variation in base pay, at the same time as the overall purchase of collective bargaining on employee earnings has diminished. The factors contributing to this development are explained.

Suggested Citation

  • James Arrowsmith & Paul Marginson, 2011. "Variable Pay and Collective Bargaining in British Retail Banking," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 49(1), pages 54-79, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:49:y:2011:i:1:p:54-79
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2009.00768.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Konstantinos Pouliakas & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2012. "The Effect of Variable Pay Schemes on Workplace Absenteeism," Research in Labor Economics, in: Research in Labor Economics, pages 109-157, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. Paul E. M. Ligthart & Erik Poutsma & Chris Brewster, 2022. "The development of financial participation in Europe," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 60(3), pages 479-510, September.
    3. Davide Antonioli & Paolo Pini & Roberto Antonietti, 2014. "Flexible pay systems and labour productivity: Evidence from Emilia-Romagna manufacturing firms," Working Papers 2014143, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.

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