Performance Pay for Teachers: Linking Individual and Organisational Level Targets
AbstractThe introduction of performance-related pay and performance management schemes in the maintained, state, school sector represents a considerable change in the school management system. This paper combines the results of opinion surveys of classroom and head teachers with Department for Education and Skills school performance data to consider the operation and impact of the new system in England since 2000. We find that teachers' response to the new system closely resembles that of other groups of public service workers to similar schemes. In particular, teachers appear not to be greatly motivated by the financial-incentive element of the system. However, the goal-setting and appraisal aspect of the system is steadily establishing itself in schools, and seems to be giving rise to a better alignment of teacher and school objectives and with those of nationallevel policy objectives. We present tentative evidence that improvements in goal setting within schools are positively related to rising pupil academic performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0703.
Date of creation: Aug 2005
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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP
Education; teachers; performance related pay; public sector; compensation; industrial relations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2005-12-01 (Education)
- NEP-HRM-2005-12-01 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-URE-2005-12-01 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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