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Pay for Performance Where Output is Hard to Measure: the Case of Performance Pay for School Teachers

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Author Info
Richard Belfield
David Marsden

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Abstract

The introduction of performance-related pay with Performance Management in the state school sector of England and Wales represents a considerable change in the school management system. After 2000, all teachers were subject to annual goal setting performance reviews. Experienced teachers were offered an extended pay scale based on performance instead of seniority, and to gain access to the new upper pay scale, teachers had to go through a 'threshold assessment' based on their professional skills and performance. This paper reports the results of a panel survey of classroom and head teachers which started in 2000 just before implementation of the new system, and then after one and after four years of operation. We find that both classroom and head teacher views have changed considerably over time, from initial general skepticism and opposition towards a more positive view, especially among head teachers by 2004. We argue that the adoption of an integrative bargaining approach to performance reviews explains why a growing minority of schools have achieved improved goal setting, and improved pupil attainments as they have implemented performancemanagement. Pay for performance has been one of the measures of organizational support that headteachers could bring to induce changes in teachers' classroom priorities. We argue that the teachers' case shows that a wider range of performance incentives than previously thought can be offered to employees in such occupations, provided that goal setting and performance measurement are approached as a form of negotiation instead of top-down.

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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0747.

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Date of creation: Aug 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0747

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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/

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Related research
Keywords: Education teachers performance related pay public sector compensation industrial relations

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Performance Pay and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 5672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Victor Lavy, 2002. "Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1286-1317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gibbons, Robert, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-32, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. D Marsden, 2000. "Teachers Before the 'Threshold'," CEP Discussion Papers 0454, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Adele Atkinson & Simon Burgess & Bronwyn Croxson & Paul Gregg, 2004. "Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for Teachers in England," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/113, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  7. Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2005. "Performance Pay for Teachers: Linking Individual and Organisational Level Targets," CEP Discussion Papers dp0703, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Helen Simpson, 2007. "Productivity in Public Services," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 07/164, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
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